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AMERICANS' LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Nadine Strossen t
Americans' attitude toward the Bill of Rights is paradoxical.
On the one hand, we rank it with the American flag and apple
pie as a core symbol of national identity and pride. What
could be more patriotic, after all, than championing a document
that is integral to our government, without which our very
Constitution may not have been ratified? Moreover, Americans
justifiably are proud of the important world-wide impact that
the Bill of Rights recently has been exerting, as an inspiration
and model for new movements toward democracy and human
rights all over the globe. To celebrate the Bill of Rights'
bicentennial in 1991, the Philip Morris Company has been
taking one of the remaining original copies of this document
on a cross-country tour, and it has attracted large and en-
thusiastic audiences everywhere. Americans throughout the land
thus seem eager to pay homage to what they apparently regard
as a semi-sacred text.
On the other hand, many Americans seem to regard the
actual enforcement of the Bill of Rights with some skepticism.
More disturbingly, too many Americans have made the startling
suggestion that those who implement the Bill of Rights are
not patriotic, but, to the contrary, are actually unpatriotic. It
is particularly distressing that this seemingly astounding as-
sertion has been made by some government leaders, including
the current President of the United States.' During the 1988
presidential election campaign, then-Vice President George Bush
repeatedly insinuated that then-Massachusetts Governor Michael
Dukakis was unpatriotic for actions that reflected Dukakis'
respect for the Bill of Rights. 2
t Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil
Liberties Union; A.B., Harvard-Radcliffe College, 1972; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1975. This Essay is a revision of an essay appearing first in the DELAwARE LAWYER
and is reprinted with its permission.
1. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 28, 1988, at A22.
2. Id.
Detroit College of Law Review
For one thing, candidate Bush attacked Dukakis' veto of a
Massachusetts statute that would have required public school
teachers to lead classroom salutes of the American flag.3 Yet,
Dukakis' veto was based on his upholding of the First Amend-
ment. Consistent with the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,4 Dukakis
recognized that to compel all teachers to profess allegiance
would violate their freedom of conscience.5 In the Barnette
case, which upheld the freedom of Jehovah's Witness school
children to refuse to salute the flag in light of their religious
objections, the Supreme Court endorsed the First Amendment's
central guarantee of free thought in these often quoted, stirring
words: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein." ' 6
These words have inspired in generations of Americans a
deepened respect for the patriotic ideas and ideals of freedom
that are symbolized by the flag. Therefore, in insisting that
the Massachusetts legislature comply with this Bill of Rights
edict, Michael Dukakis was showing himself to be a true patriot.
To the contrary, George Bush revealed a lack of under-
standing and respect for the values of individual liberty that
are symbolized in our nation's icon both in his criticism of
Dukakis' veto and in his subsequent efforts to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson.7 In that case,
the Court held that the First Amendment protects the right
to burn the American flag as an expression of political protest.8
George Bush immediately denounced the decision and called
for a constitutional amendment to limit the scope of the First
3. Tom Wicker, In the Nation, It's Still Bush League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1988, at A35.
4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5. Wicker, supra note 3.
6. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
7. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
8. Id. at 420.
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Amendment, to make an exception for flag-burning. 9 President
Bush thus advocated what would have been the first truncation
of the Bill of Rights in any respect since its ratification.
Moreover, President Bush sought to deal a particularly dev-
astating blow to the Bill of Rights by limiting the expression
of political dissent. Such expression long has been viewed as
at the heart of the free speech guarantee, which is itself widely
considered to be a "preferred freedom," of supreme importance
among the Bill of Rights pantheon. Most ironically, President
Bush characterized his recommendation as a gesture of patri-
otism, 0 and many citizens and public officials who supported
this effort to curtail the First Amendment sounded the same
allegedly patriotic theme. They clearly had forgotten the prin-
ciple, which is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, "Dissent
is the highest form of patriotism."
Another respect in which candidate George Bush inverted
patriotic values-by suggesting that it is patriotic to undermine
the Bill of Rights, and unpatriotic to defend these rights-was
in his attacks on Michael Dukakis' membership in the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and thus on the ACLU itself.
It is appalling that Bush was able to depict his opponent's
support of an organization dedicated to enforcing the Bill of
Rights for all as a liability. To the contrary, such support
should be viewed as an asset. Indeed, it is useful to recall,
Michael Dukakis regarded it as such as he is the one who
brought his membership to public attention during the cam-
paign, proudly boasting that he was a "card-carrying member"
of the ACLU. I
To be sure, as the head of this organization that prides
itself on defending freedom of thought and expression-in-
cluding for dissenters-I am hardly arguing that all ACLU
policies unquestionably set forth the only correct way of in-
terpreting the Bill of Rights. Therefore, I would be no more
offended by George Bush's criticism of particular ACLU pol-
9. Robin Tower, President to Seek Amendment to Bar Burning of the Flag,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1989, at Al.
10. Maureen Dowd, Bush Promises Vigilance on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1989, at A7.
11. Michael Winerip, Hello? A.C.L. U. ? I'm a Republican, But I Need Help!,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1988, at B1.
1991] 1183
Detroit College of Law Review
icies than I am by dissenting opinions from specific Supreme
Court constructions of Bill of Rights provisions.
Reasonable people who support the Bill of Rights' general
libertarian philosophy may differ about particular issues con-
cerning the interpretation and application of a certain Bill of
Rights provision in a specific context. Indeed, there are spirited
debates and disagreements about these issues within the ACLU
itself. The ACLU's policies are adopted pursuant to National
Board debates, which are always lively, and virtually never
result in unanimous votes. To the contrary, many ACLU
policies result from closely divided votes. Accordingly, even
the top leadership of the ACLU itself includes many dissenters
from many policies.
What is troubling about George Bush's attack, though, was
its broad-gauged nature. Although he criticized particular ACLU
policies, he did so in the context of impugning the organization
in general, and thus seeking to discredit its overall goal of
enforcing the Bill of Rights. Bush would be hard-pressed to
deny support for the innumerable uncontroversial policies in
the ACLU's Policy Guide, which set out conventional under-
standings of liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Instead,
he chose to mention only a few policies (out of approximately
five hundred) with which he disagreed and which were likely
to be unpopular or controversial with the public. Based on
his disagreement with these selected policies, Bush sought to
disparage the ACLU in general. This approach is the equivalent
of singling out several of the Supreme Court's most contro-
versial decisions enforcing the Bill of Rights, in support of an
effort to discredit the Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights
in general.
What accounts for the disparity between the two strains in
the prevailing American attitude toward the Bill of Rights that
I have just described: on the one hand near reverence, but on
the other hand hostility? I think the discrepancy results from
the distinction between an abstract view of the Bill of Rights
and a specific one, and between a concept of the Bill of Rights
as enunciating some general precepts and a concept that it
actually guarantees particular freedoms in concrete current con-
texts. In short, many Americans support the Bill of Rights as
an expression of disembodied ideals, but are suspicious of it
as a charter for action. In the remainder of this Essay, I will
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outline three major aspects of the controversy surrounding the
Bill of Rights' actual implementation. By showing the mis-
understandings that underlie wariness about enforcing the Bill
of Rights, I hope to counter this attitude.
The first, most basic element in the widespread misunder-
standing of the Bill of Rights is straightforward ignorance.
Public opinion polls consistently show that an alarmingly high
percentage of the general population is simply not familiar
with the Bill of Rights.1 2 When its provisions are read to them,
not only do they not recognize the terms as being incorporated
in the American Constitution, but, even worse, many assume
that these terms come from a very un-American document,
such as a Communist tract. For example, an editorial in the
San Diego Union noted that in a recent public opinion poll
59 per cent of Americans could not identify the Bill of Rights.
Many pundits doubt whether the American people would even ratify
those liberties if they were put to a vote today. In fact, some
Americans would gladly dispense with many of the liberties con-
tained in the Bill of Rights.1
The broad public lack of understanding of the Bill of Rights
generally also applies to specific Bill of Rights provisions. For
example, to commemorate the two hundredth anniversary of
the First Amendment, the American Society of Newspaper
Editors commissioned a survey of public opinions about free
speech.' 4 Virtually all of the respondents expressed a generalized
belief in free speech, but substantial numbers "understood"
free speech as not protecting expression concerning numerous
controversial or sensitive subjects. 5 In short, many respondents
believed in the abstract idea of free speech, but not in its
actual enforcement.
When asked if the press should be free to criticize political
leaders, twenty-two percent said such criticism should never be
protected, and forty-one percent said it should be protected
12. ROBERT 0. WYATT, FREE EXPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: A SURVEY
COMMEMORATING THE 200TH ANIVERSARY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
13. See Nat Hentoff, Imagining Life Without the Bill of Rights, WASH. POST,
July 27, 1991, at A23.
14. WYATT, supra note 12.
15. Id.
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only sometimes.' 6 Moreover, during the Persian Gulf War,
forty-three percent said that press opposition to the U.S. po-
sition and support for a foreign government position should
never be protected."7 Yet, virtually all the respondents who did
not think the First Amendment sheltered these critical views
on central public policy issues-which the courts consistently
have held to be at the core of First Amendment protected
speech-also described themselves as believing in free speech!
Thus, when people say they believe in free speech, they are
not referring to the concept of free speech that is enshrined
in the First Amendment and that has been consistently enforced
by Supreme Court Justices with widely varying constitutional
philosophies.
Even putting aside the fundamental problem that too many
Americans are literally unfamiliar with the Bill of Rights' terms
and meaning, there is a second important aspect of the mis-
understanding surrounding this document. Many people believe
that the Bill of Rights should protect them-and people like
them-but not others. This type of misunderstanding is often
leveled at the ACLU's efforts to enforce the Bill of Rights.
No one ever asks why we defend free speech in general.
However, we frequently are asked why we defend free speech
for a particular person or group. Why, people inquire, does
the ACLU advocate the right to make particular nasty, of-
fensive, wrongheaded, and repugnant statements? The answer
is simple: only those statements are the targets of censorship.
Nice, correct, uncontroversial statements are almost never sub-
ject to censorship, and hence rarely require express invocations
of the First Amendment. As we often explain, in an important
sense, our real client is not the particular speaker who utters
the offensive words that prompt government attempts to stifle
them. Rather, in essential respects, our actual client is the Bill
of Rights itself, as well as all Americans since they all benefit
from a climate of freedom.
The foregoing ideas are often encapsulated in the notion of
the "indivisibility" of rights. In other words, if freedom of
speech is denied to any idea, any speaker, or any group, then
16. Id. at 185.
17. Id. at 233.
1186 [4:1181
Love-Hate Relationship
it is not safe for any idea, any speaker, or any group. Once
the government is given power to decide that a particular idea
is too extreme or dangerous or offensive to deserve protection,
then that power can be unleashed against any other idea.
Just as a decision that particular speech is unprotected will
constitute an adverse precedent, permitting the suppression of
other speech, so too, a decision that certain speech is protected
will constitute a positive precedent that will shelter other speech.
What is viewed as extreme or dangerous or offensive varies
enormously from time to time and place to place. Therefore,
a decision protecting speech that conveys a particular message
can be used to shield speech that conveys a diametrically
opposed message.
In decisions issued during the 1930's and 1940's," the Su-
preme Court protected speech expressing racial bigotry by
speakers whose views were abhorrent to many listeners. In
Terminiello v. Chicago, 9 for example, the Court protected
attacks on racial and political groups that were well represented
in the Chicago neighborhood where the speech occurred, thus
profoundly upsetting and angering many listeners. In the 1960's,
Terminiello and other similar cases were cited as precedents
for judicial decisions that protected the free speech rights of
Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders, who conveyed
their anti-bigotry messages in segregated Southern towns. 20 Thus,
again, many listeners were profoundly upset and angered.
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed repeatedly the idea of
the indivisibility of speech, most recently in the two decisions
that upheld the right to burn the U.S. flag to express political
protest. 21 Significantly, those opinions were joined by Justices
who spanned the Court's ideological range, from Justice Bren-
nan at the liberal end to Justice Scalia at its conservative end.
18. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
19. 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
20. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Henry v. City of Rock
Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
21. United States v. Eichman, 110 S.Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989).
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This unusual alliance underscores that support for a content-
neutral enforcement of the Bill of Rights is not peculiar to
any particular view of constitutional philosophy, but can be
fairly described as inhering in the constitutional philosophy
itself. Thus, the ideologically disparate Justices who joined in
both rulings declared it "a bedrock principle" that speech may
not be censored because of disagreement with or disapproval
of the ideas it expresses.22
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court so consistently has
protected speech that audiences have found to be abhorrent
or offensive, many members of the public-perhaps most-
believe that some speech with which they disagree should be
censored. Conversely, most people become advocates of free
speech in the context of seeking to protect certain speech with
which they agree. Recently, for example, free speech principles
have been actively espoused by many conservatives who have
not been otherwise notable free speech champions. Many con-
servatives view the "politically correct" or "PC" movement
on university campuses as threatening the expression of con-
servative views. Therefore, to protect those expressions, they
rely on free speech principles.
Perhaps the most prominent example of this phenomenon
is President Bush. As described above, he repeatedly has crit-
icized the reliance on free speech guarantees to protect the
expression of political and religious dissidents. However, during
a commencement address at the University of Michigan last
spring, he strongly supported free speech guarantees to protect
mainstream conservative views. 23
Another example is the arch-conservative Republican Con-
gressman, Henry Hyde of Illinois, who was a supporter of
the proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit flag burning
as a political protest. However, this year, Congressman Hyde
sponsored the Collegiate Speech Protection Act, 24 which would
have precisely the opposite effect: expanding the scope of the
free speech clause, rather than narrowing it. This commendable
22. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
23. President George Bush, Address before the University of Michigan 1991
Graduating Seniors, in MICH. TODAY, May 4, 1991, at 9-11.
24. H.R. 1380, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
1188 [4:1181
Love-Hate Relationship
Act, which the ACLU enthusiastically endorses, would extend
free speech protection to students at private colleges and uni-
versities. 25 In effect, it would make the First Amendment ap-
plicable to those students, although the Amendment itself is
directly applicable only to students at state schools, because
of the state action doctrine.
Consistent with the ACLU's non-partisan, non-political na-
ture, I want to underscore that I do not single out only
conservatives or Republicans to illustrate my point that people
are more enthusiastic about protecting free speech made by
those who share their views. The point is a general one, and
I could easily illustrate it through examples drawn from the
ranks of liberals or Democrats too. For example, on the very
day I joined Congressman Hyde at a press conference to
announce the ACLU's support of his Collegiate Speech Pro-
tection Act, I had a meeting with the liberal Democratic Sen-
ator, Ted Kennedy, in which Senator Kennedy questioned the
ACLU's defense of a type of speech that he found problem-
atical: tobacco advertising. Consistent with his goal of regu-
lating the sale of tobacco products to promote public health,
Senator Kennedy was considering limitations on the advertising
of such products. The ACLU, in contrast, views such adver-
tising as protected commercial speech, which can be subject
only to narrowly drawn regulations.
In using President Bush, Congressman Hyde, and Senator
Kennedy to illustrate my point, I must emphasize that they
are simply prominent examples of a general-if not universal-
attitude. This attitude was vividly captured by the Executive
Director of the National Coalition Against Censorship, Leanne
Katz, when she said, "Everyone has his or her Skokie." She
was referring, of course, to the widely publicized case in the
late 1970's, in which the ACLU defended-and the courts
upheld-the right of a neo-Nazi group to stage a peaceful
demonstration in Skokie, Illinois, a community with many Jews
and many Holocaust survivors. 26
25. Id.
26. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978).
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What Ms. Katz meant was that everyone regards one type
of speech as uniquely abhorrent, one message as so supremely
obnoxious that it should be banned, even though other speech
should be protected. In other words, everyone would like to
make "just one" exception to the First Amendment. The
problem, though, is that for each individual, it may well be
a different exception. For example, many of the Holocaust
survivors in Skokie would censor anti-Semitic speech; Jesse
Helms and many fundamentalist religious leaders would censor
immoral speech; George Bush and many other elected gov-
ernment officials would censor flag burning; some feminists
would censor sexually explicit speech that is degrading to women;
or some minority group representatives would censor racist
speech.
The foregoing litany should underscore the necessity of the
indivisibility principle. For, once we allow speech to be reg-
ulated on the ground that there is substantial opposition to
the idea it conveys, there is no limiting principle to prevent
the aggregated exceptions from swallowing the rule. As Thomas
Paine said: "He that would make his own liberty secure must
guard even his enemy from oppression, for if he violates this
duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself. ' 27
I would like to turn now to a third aspect of the controversy
and misunderstanding that unfortunately surrounds the Bill of
Rights. Even if people believe that the Bill of Rights generally
should be neutrally enforced, including to protect the rights
of those with whom they disagree, many believe that we should
make exceptions to those rights in light of changes in societal
conditions since they were adopted two hundred years ago.
They argue that society is more complex and dangerous now,
and that we face new threats to individual and national security
which render Bill of Rights freedoms unaffordable luxuries.
I find it ironic that many people who advance this argument
are self-described conservatives who generally take pride in
abiding by the Constitution's plain language and original intent.
What they are advocating through this argument is a departure
27. Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government, in COMMON
SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 174 (Wilson F. Adkins ed., 1953).
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not only from the terms of the Bill of Rights, but also from
its intent and the circumstances giving rise to it.
The individuals who framed and ratified the Bill of Rights
participated in the violent revolution that gave birth to our
nation. Moreover, during the very period when the Bill of
Rights was proposed, debated, and adopted, our then new
nation was facing serious threats to its ongoing stability. Many
members of the founding generation believed that the young,
fragile nation's very survival was in jeopardy, both from in-
ternal difficulties and strife-including some armed insurrec-
tions-and from external assaults. American ships were being
fired upon on the high seas, and our land was being attacked
from across the Canadian border. Indeed, it was precisely their
expressed fear for the nation's continued viability that led the
Federalists to call the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
in 1787, and ultimately to their proposed Constitution.
Despite the fact that from 1787 to 1791 national and in-
dividual security were at least as severely embattled as they
were at any subsequent time in American history, the Bill of
Rights was then added to the Constitution. Indeed, for many
members of the founding generation, the addition of the Bill
of Rights was a prerequisite for ratifying the Constitution.
Even those who opposed the initial inclusion of the Bill of
Rights in the original Constitution did so not because they did
not support the Bill of Rights' libertarian guarantees, but rather,
because they believed it was unnecessary to set forth these
rights expressly. They believed that, even under the unamended
original Constitution, the government would not be able to
deprive individuals of the various freedoms enunciated in the
Bill of Rights. That conclusion rested on the fact that the
Constitution created a government of limited powers only-
namely, those powers that the Constitution specifically enu-
merated-and the enumerated powers did not include powers
to deprive individuals of rights. This argument has substantial
force; perhaps the Bill of Rights would not have been necessary
as a bulwark against governmental infringement on freedom.
Nevertheless, significantly, the founding generation chose to
err on the side of caution to ensure that the new government
would not infringe on individual rights. Thus, promptly after
the original Constitution was ratified, they added the express
1991]
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prohibitions on governmental infringements of liberty that are
contained in the Bill of Rights.
In light of this history, it is clear that the original intent
of those who incorporated the Bill of Rights into our Con-
stitution would not have permitted limitations on freedom to
preserve security. To the contrary, even in their perilous era,
the framers and ratifiers nonetheless bent over backwards to
make clear beyond peradventure that order and security could
not be achieved at the expense of liberty. Rather, consistent
with the enlightenment philosophy that inspired them, they
viewed the very raison d'etre of organized society and gov-
ernment as the protection of freedom. As Thomas Jefferson
wrote to James Madison, "A society that will trade a little
liberty for a little order will deserve neither and will lose
both.' '28
How different that eloquent statement is from today's rhet-
oric about the relative importance of liberty and order! Sadly,
public opinion surveys reveal that many members of the public
would willingly sacrifice their own freedom-not to mention
that of others, such as individuals accused or convicted of
crime-in order to address such pressing societal problems as
crime and drug abuse. More troublingly, government officials
also make, and in some cases enforce, similarly inverted views
about the hierarchy between order and liberty.
A particularly shocking example of the latter attitude was
described in a recent news article in the Chicago Tribune.29 It
reported that Chicago Police Superintendent LeRoy Martin,
who heads this nation's second largest police department, had
advocated policies infringing on basic liberties in order to
combat crime. Far from honoring the language or intent of
our ancestors who ratified the Bill of Rights, Superintendent
Martin acknowledged that his role models came from totali-
tarian societies: a Communist dictatorship and a fascist dic-
tatorship. The news story provided the following account:
28. See Williams v. Garrett, 722 F. Supp. 254, 256 (1989) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson).
29. Robert Blau & William Recktenwald, Let's Fight Crime As Chinese Do,
Martin Says, Cm. Trm., July 12, 1991, at Al.
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Chicago Police Supt. LeRoy Martin has returned from China
with a modest proposal for the war on crime: the suspension of
certain constitutional rights and emulation of the Chinese prison
system.
"The sanitary facilities are a bucket. The prisoners are given a
bowl of rice and a Thermos bottle of tea. And then they're locked
down," said Martin of his recent tour of Chinese prisons. "I know
we're a democracy, but you know, I don't think everything the
Communists do can't be copied .... And I think there are some
things they do that are better than what we do."
While visiting China, Martin said, he found much to admire
about the country's handling of criminals. He noted that drug
dealers were sentenced to execution by firing squad....
[T]he police superintendent said he believed his views reflected
popular sentiment .... "[A] lot of people would be in favor of
the kind of things that I am talking about," he said.
Reminded that Adolf Hitler's ideas were also popular in Nazi
Germany, the superintendent replied: "And they had a very low
crime rate then.' '30
Even though I have read that last statement several times,
it still sends a shudder down my spine every time I see it. I
think that Jefferson, Madison, and the other Founding Fathers
of this great nation would turn over in their graves if they
heard those statements by this important government official,
whose specific responsibility is to maintain law and order
consistent with the Bill of Rights. These statements embody
such a dramatic departure from the ideals for which the Found-
ing Fathers and others of their generation risked their lives.
Sad as it is, perhaps it is not gurprising that executive officials
such as police chiefs would view the Bill of Rights as an
expendable superfluity, when its implementation makes it more
difficult or inconvenient to achieve their administrative objec-
tives. Even more distressing is that this same view is widely
shared among the very branch of the federal government that
was intended to be the ultimate guardian of the Bill of Rights,
the judiciary. The Constitution provided that federal judges
would have life-time tenure precisely to afford them shelter
from the political pressures and day-to-day efficiency concerns
that influence the decisions of executive and legislative officials.
The courts' willingness to sacrifice constitutional rights in
the hope of combatting a perceived societal problem is best
illustrated, currently, by the "War on Drugs." Many consti-
30. Id.
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tutional scholars believe that this campaign would be more
aptly titled the "War on the Bill of Rights." In effect, they
note, the courts have created a "drug exception" to many
otherwise applicable Bill of Rights guarantees.
This strategy is not only unprincipled, but it is also inef-
fective. Despite the sacrifice of many constitutional protections,
the drug problem continues to be viewed as a major national
crisis. Even Justice Scalia, a conservative who generally defers
to law enforcement concerns and to the elected branches of
government, has harshly condemned the Supreme Court's will-
ingness to compromise constitutional values for the sake of
ineffectual gestures to counter the drug problem.3' In one case,
dissenting from the majority's upholding of warrantless, sus-
picionless, random drug tests, notwithstanding the Fourth
Amendment's plain warrant and probable cause requirements,
Justice Scalia excoriated the resulting "immolation of privacy
and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use." '3 2
Tragically, Thomas Jefferson's observation to James Madison,
which I quoted above, has proven prophetic. Because it is so
powerful and so apt, I will repeat it: "A society that would
trade a little liberty for a little order will deserve neither and
will lose both." '33
Notwithstanding the misunderstood and controversial nature
of the Bill of Rights two centuries after its adoption, I do
not think that those of us who champion it should be dis-
couraged. We should recognize that such misunderstanding and
controversy probably are inevitably associated with the doc-
ument, given its countermajoritarian nature. The framers rec-
ognized that, despite the democratic virtues of a representative
government elected by popular majorities, such a government
could deprive individuals and minority groups of rights just
as much as an unelected, unrepresentative government. There-
fore, the Bill of Rights was designed to protect against what
James Madison labeled the "tyranny of the majority. ' 34 By
definition, then, the Bill of Rights will be invoked to protect
31. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
32. Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. See supra note 28.
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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rights that have been infringed by governmental actions that
are deemed to be in the majority's best interests. Accordingly,
an individual's or minority group's reliance on the Bill of
Rights to overturn the majoritarian preference probably will
provoke the community's disfavor.
Although defenders of the Bill of Rights may be destined
to be in a minority, they should derive comfort from the fact
that they are following a noble, and supremely patriotic, tra-
dition. Let me repeat Thomas Jefferson's important words on
this point: "Dissent is the highest form of patriotism." En-
forcers of the Bill of Rights should draw inspiration from the
fact that they are helping to maintain the vitality of freedoms
for which our ancestors put their lives on the line two hundred
years ago, and for which people all over the world are risking
their lives today.
The Bill of Rights embodies the unsuppressable, powerful
idea of freedom, which is kept alive through speech and thought.
In closing, I will quote one of my favorite expressions of
passionate commitment to this ideal. It was authored by the
writer E.B. White in an essay entitled One Man's Meat." White
first published this essay in Harpers Magazine in September
1940, before the U.S. had entered the war against Nazism and
during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact, when both the right
and the left in the U.S. chose to ignore totalitarian threats to
Democracy. Although White was saddened that so many of
his contemporaries seemed to have lost their zeal for freedom,
he maintained his own enthusiastic commitment, as well as his
faith that such zeal would always be kept alive and passed on
through the power of free speech and press.36
For those of us who believe that the Bill of Rights is being
honored in the breach during its bicentennial year, when it
should be celebrated and reaffirmed, White's impassioned words
provide consolatory historical perspective. He wrote:
I have often noticed on my trips up to the city that people have
recut their clothes to follow the fashion. On my last trip, however,
35. E.B. White, One Man's Meat, 181 HARPERS 441-43 (1940).
36. Id. at 443.
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it seemed to me that people had remodeled their ideas too-taken
in their convictions a little at the waist, shortened the sleeves of
their resolve, and fitted themselves out in a new intellectual ensemble
copied from a smart design out of the very latest page of his-
tory ....
.... I feel sick when I find anyone adjusting his mind to the
new tyranny which is succeeding abroad .... I resent the patronizing
air of persons who find in my plain belief in freedom a sign of
immaturity. If it is boyish to believe that a human being should
live free, then I'll gladly arrest my development and let the rest
of the world grow up.
I believe in freedom with the same burning delight, the same
faith, the same intense abandon which attended its birth on this
continent more than a century and a half ago.
[T]he free spirit of man is persistent in nature; it recurs, and
has never successfully been wiped out.... I am inordinately proud
these days of the quill, for it has shown itself, historically, to be
the hypodermic which inoculates men and keeps the germ of freedom
always in circulation, so that there are individuals in every time
in every land who are the carriers, the Typhoid Marys, capable
of infecting others by mere contact and example. 7
I hope that I have infected some readers of this Essay with
my own passionate enthusiasm for freedom, and for that great
American contribution to freedom, the Bill of Rights.
37. Id. at 441-43.
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